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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between teacher unionization, student achievement and 
teachers’ pay using a cross-section of data from private schools in India. We use differences 
in student mark across subjects to identify within-pupil variation in achievement and find that 
union membership of the teacher appears to strongly reduce pupil achievement. We find no 
evidence this could be due to the unobservables not controlled for by this procedure. A school 
fixed effects equation of teacher pay shows that union membership substantially raises pay 
and in this case too we find that remaining unobservables are unlikely to explain this 
outcome. We thus have in this data clear evidence that unions raise cost and reduce student 
achievement.  
JEL Code: I21. 
Keywords: teacher unions, teacher salaries, student achievement, productivity, India. 
 
Geeta Kingdon 
Institute of Education 
London University 
20 Bedford Way 
London WC1H 0AL 
United Kingdom 
g.kingdon@ioe.ac.uk 
Francis Teal 
Department of Economics 
University of Oxford 
Manor Road 
Oxford, OX1 3UQ 
United Kingdom 
francis.teal@economics.ox.ac.uk 
 
  
September 2008 
This paper was presented to the Conference on ‘Economic Incentives: Do They Work in 
Education?’ 15-17 May 2008 jointly organised by CESifo and PEPG (Program on Education 
Policy and Governance), Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 
This paper has benefited from the comments of Joshua Angrist, Martin Browning, Paul 
Collier, Esther Duflo, Paul Glewwe, Eric Hanushek, Helen Ladd, Stephen Machin, Lant 
Pritchett, Måns Söderbom and Alessandro Tarozzi, as well as the comments of participants at 
the NEUDC, Royal Economic Society and CES-ifo/PEPG conferences. We are greatly 
indebted to Todd Elder for sharing STATA routines with us. Any errors are ours. We would 
like to thank the Council for Indian Secondary Certificate Examinations for enabling data 
collection from affiliated schools. Funding from ESRC Global Poverty Research Group and 
the DFID RECOUP consortium on ‘Outcomes of Education’ is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 Introduction 
Under different theoretical models, teacher unionization can lead to higher or lower student 
achievement. Conceptually there are two major reasons why teachers may become union 
members (Hoxby, 1996). The first is that teachers maximise the same objective function as 
parents, namely student achievement, but have superior information about the correct input 
mixes. Union membership provides teachers with a collective voice to implement these input 
mixes. This may include for instance asking for lower class sizes or higher salaries which help to 
attract and retain superior teachers. The second potential reason for teachers joining a union is 
that they have a different objective function than parents or school management, possibly one in 
which school policies that directly affect them, such as teacher salaries, receive greater weight 
than policies that only indirectly affect them, i.e. membership of a rent-seeking teachers’ union1. 
A rent-seeking union may block reform of incentives to improve instruction, e.g. by tying salaries 
to seniority rather than to performance and by protecting ineffective teachers from dismissal. 
Under rent seeking, unions may also lower achievement if their pursuit of higher salaries diverts 
resources away from other school inputs that raise achievement and if teacher union strikes 
                                                 
1 Loveless (2000), Ballou (2001) and Ballou and Podgursky (2000) argue that unions retard 
school reform. On the other hand, Henderson, Urban and Wolman (2004) argue that in recent 
times the public “has been exposed to a barrage of pejorative views” about teacher unions which 
“by and large condemn unions as obstacles to efficiency and quality” but do not recognise what 
unions have contributed towards building a quality public education system. Stone (2000) and 
Eberts (2007) summarize the US literature on the effect of teacher unions on student 
achievement. 
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disrupt teaching. Finally, since teachers interact with other inputs in order to produce education, 
rent seeking unions could lower the efficiency of the other inputs, such that more money for 
schools may not matter (Burtless, 2000; Lemke, 2004; Hoxby, 1996). 
The sign of the relationship between teacher union membership and student achievement 
is thus an empirical question. This paper addresses this empirical question asking how teacher 
unions affect student achievement and teacher’s pay. We pose these questions with a unique 
dataset on private secondary schools from India which permits pupil fixed effects estimation of 
the achievement function, enabling us to address what are arguably the most important sources of 
endogeniety bias. 
As has been widely recognised in the achievement production function literature, 
imputing causality from any cross-section correlation between teacher attributes and student 
outcomes is problematic as students may match to schools and teachers endogenously. While 
randomized experiments provide a good solution to the problem of endogeneity in general (see 
Duflo and Hanna, 2005, for one educational application in India), they cannot be used here since 
union membership cannot be randomly allocated. Although quasi-experimental approaches such 
as propensity score matching methods have been used to evaluate education program impacts 
(e.g. Machin and McNally, 2004), they require the assumption that matching based on pre-
treatment observables adequately captures all relevant characteristics of treated units. Valid 
instrumental variables are difficult to find and only few studies have convincingly tested impact 
effects in education using the IV approach (e.g. Angrist and Lavy,1999). The IV approach is 
often infeasible in developing countries because even where official (exogenous) rules, e.g. about 
maximum class-size or school start age etc., exist in law, they are rarely adhered to in practice. 
The panel data approach requires longitudinal data and this is scarce.  
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We examine the effect of teacher union membership on pupil learning using the standard 
cross-section achievement production function but allowing for pupil fixed effects. This is 
possible because the data used here provide each student’s marks in five different subjects 
(English, second language, history/geography, math, science). We link the average characteristics 
of the teachers who teach that subject within the school to the achievement of the student. This 
approach allows us to control for all student and family unobservables and examine whether the 
union membership status of different subject teachers in a school is related to a student’s marks 
across those subjects. In other words, we estimate a within-pupil across-subject equation of the 
achievement production function rather than a within-pupil across-time one. After investigating 
the union effect on pupil learning, we also examine the teacher pay schedule to ask whether 
unionized teachers are paid more once we control for their observable skills and the unobservable 
characteristics of the school.2  
While the above approach can control for many possible sources of endogeneity, it cannot 
control for all. To see if the remaining unobservables could be explaining our results, we adopt 
the procedure developed by Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) to assess how important these 
unobservables would need to be to explain our result. How important unobservables will be 
depends on what we can observe so in the next section we set out the data and model explicitly 
the potential role of unobservables in explaining our results. Section 3 presents estimates of how 
                                                 
2 While much has been written on the effect of teacher unions on student achievement in the US, 
both by economists and non-economists (Eberts and Stone, 1987; Betts, 1996; Hoxby, 1996; 
Ballou and Podgursky, 2000; Lemke, 2004; Eberts, 2007; Loveless, 2000; Carini, 2002; 
Henderson, Urban and Wolman, 2004), we are not aware of any research on this topic in 
developing countries in general and in India in particular. 
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union membership affects achievement and section 4 the results for the effect of union 
membership on teacher pay. A final section concludes. 
 
2 Observables and Unobservables for Student Achievement 
The data for this study come from a sample of 186 schools affiliated to the Council for Indian 
Secondary Certificate Examinations (CISCE) which is an English Medium exam board. The 
schools were chosen by a stratified random sampling procedure within 16 major Indian states (the 
strata). The sampling procedure is explained in Kingdon (2006). Postal questionnaires sent by the 
Exam Board were filled by all students of grade 10 in the sample schools, and by the teachers that 
teach them, as well as by the school Principal. Grade 10 students are aged approximately 16 years 
old and the grade 10 board examination in CISCE schools is equivalent to the High School board 
examination in other Indian exam boards, such as the state examination boards or the Central 
Board of Secondary Education. The overwhelming proportion of CICSE affiliated schools are 
private unaided schools, i.e. run without state aid (95%), 3.2% are aided schools (mainly in West 
Bengal), and only 1.6% are government or local body schools. Thus the sample represents mainly 
English Medium private secondary schools in India. 
The student questionnaire captured information on a wide range of the child’s personal 
characteristics including age, gender, health, disability, and time-use, as well as detailed family 
characteristics such as household demographics, asset/wealth ownership, parental education and 
occupation. Pupils were also given a test of ability/IQ based on 36-items in Sets A, C and D of 
the Ravens Progressive Matrices test. The teacher questionnaire collected information on a range 
of teacher characteristics and the school questionnaire elicited data on student and teacher 
numbers, school facilities and resources, length of the instructional program, school fees, and 
management and teacher motivation aspects.  
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Examination results data were subsequently provided by the exam board and matched to 
students using a unique pupil identifier code. Students of grade 10 in the CISCE exam board have 
5 compulsory and one optional subject. The optional subject is chosen from among a large 
number of subject choices and thus varies a great deal between students. We wish to use exam 
marks of students in the 5 compulsory subjects: English, Second language, History/Geography, 
Math and Science3. Table 1 shows mean mark by subject. Figure 1 shows Epanechnikov kernel 
densities of marks in different subjects. It is clear that the distribution of marks in different 
subjects differs appreciably. For instance, the distribution of the second-language mark is quite 
different to that of other subjects. In order to render the marks in the different subjects 
comparable, we standardize the mark in each subject by the national mean mark in the subject, 
i.e. we use the z-score of achievement as our dependent variable. The z-score is a student’s mark 
in a subject less the national mean mark in that subject, divided by the standard deviation of mark 
in the subject. Thus, by construction, mean z score in any given subject is 0 and its standard 
                                                 
3 As the ICSE exam board is an English Medium exam board, all subjects in affiliated schools are 
taught in English. The local state language is considered the ‘Second language’ and it is typically 
a child’s mother tongue. While History and Geography are tested separately, their marks are 
pooled by the examination board and provided together, i.e. they are treated as one subject. 
Similarly, while physics, chemistry and biology are tested separately, their marks are lumped 
together. When matching student marks in a subject to the characteristics of the teacher that 
taught them that subject, we have taken the average characteristics of the teachers that taught 
them that subject. Thus, if history and geography were taught to grade 10 by different teachers, 
we have taken the average characteristics of the history and geography teachers as the relevant 
characteristics to match with a student’s history-geography subject-row. 
 6
deviation is 1. Figure 2 shows the distribution of z-score for all subjects. Appendix Table 1 
defines variables and shows descriptive statistics. The OLS regressions of standardized 
achievement by subject are presented in Appendix Table 2, as an extension of the descriptive 
statistics, but we do not discuss these. 
As a result of this data collection we have marks across subjects for the same student 
within a school as well as an extensive range of controls for both the student and the teacher. We 
have taken the average of characteristics of the subject teachers within a school so we have 
variation in these characteristics for a student across subjects. It is this cross-subject variation we 
intend to exploit in establishing if there is an effect from unions onto student achievement. 
(1) ( )ijk ij jk j i j k ijkA X T S vα β γ δ μ ε η= + + + + + + +      
ijkA is achievement of the i
th student in the jth school in the kth subject, X  is a vector of 
characteristics of the ith student in the jth school, T  a vector of characteristics (including union 
membership) of the teacher of the jth school for subject k and  a vector of characteristics of the 
jth school. 
S
iμ , jε and kη  represent the unobserved characteristics of the student, the school and 
the subject respectively. The remaining unobservables are in the error term, , and it is their 
potential correlation with the observables, in particular the union variable, that is the key to being 
able to identify a causal effect from unionization onto achievement. We proceed by seeking to 
identify the Union effect separately from the other teacher characteristics which we treat as 
controls: 
ijkv
(2) ( )ijk ij jk jk j i j k ijkA X TC U S vα β γ θ δ μ ε η= + + + + + + + +  
where jkTC is all teacher characteristics that are independent of the unionization term, jkU . The 
teacher’s characteristics that we are going to use in our achievement production function are:  
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(3)  { , , , , , }jk jk jk jk jk jkTC High Train Divison Christian Female Age= jk  
where jkHigh is whether the teacher has a higher qualification meaning an MA or PhD 
qualification, jkTrain  is whether the teacher has pre-service teacher training, jkDivision is whether 
the teacher had obtained first division in his/her higher secondary exam (a proxy for teacher’s 
own cognitive skills), jkChristian is whether the teacher is a Christian, jkFemale indicates their 
gender and jkeAg their age. All these characteristics can be viewed as pre-determined for the 
union variable. We also have information on other teacher characteristics which arguably may 
not be. We denote these as : 'jkTC
(4) ' { , , , }jk jk jk jkTC Leave Experience Tenure Permanent= jk  
where jkLeave is the days of sick leave last year, jkExperience  is the total years of teaching 
experience, jkureTen  is years of tenure in current school and jkrmanentPe  is whether the teacher 
has a permanent position. All the arguments of 'jkTC arguably may be at least in part determined 
by the union status of the teacher so including them in the student achievement function would 
bias down the effect of unionization. To test whether our results are sensitive to their inclusion 
we report regressions which include the arguments of both jk 'TC and jkTC . We apply a similar 
argument to our equation for Teacher’s pay  
(5) { }jk jk jkP TC U u jkφ ϕ= + +  
where jkP is the pay of the teacher. If we wish to identify the effect of unionization on pay it 
seems necessary to exclude variables from the regression which, arguably, are in part determined 
by unionization. Again we test if our results are sensitive to the exclusion of the variables in the 
'
jkTC vector.  
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Equations (2) and (5) are our equations of interest and for both we need to allow for the 
possibility that there remain unobservables in the error terms correlated with the union variable. 
Before considering this problem we outline how across-subject differencing has two important 
methodological advantages over across-time differencing.  
Firstly, the across-subject approach does not suffer from the problem of non-random 
attrition of teachers and students over time that occurs in panel data. For instance, in their panel 
study relating student achievement to teacher characteristics using North Carolina data, 
Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2006) highlight the difficulty of determining whether a higher 
coefficient on teacher experience reflects a teacher’s improved effectiveness with experience or 
the differentially higher attrition of the less effective teachers4, and Rivkin et al (2005) also 
address non-random attrition. Across-subject estimation obviates this problem since estimation is 
within pupil at one point in time. While the potential for endogenous selection into the 
‘surviving’ teachers’ group is the same in both approaches, the across-time technique relies on 
change in teacher over time (over which non-random attrition can take place) as part of the 
estimation strategy, while the across-subject technique does not.  
The second methodological advantage is that the across-subject approach provides a 
means to circumvent the potential problem of non-random matching of students to particular 
teachers within the school on the basis of their unobserved characteristics – whether it be brighter 
students matching to abler teachers or school policy deliberately matching slower students to 
abler teachers. Across-subject estimation bypasses the problem either by averaging the 
                                                 
4 They say that due to the technical difficulty of including both pupil and teacher fixed effects in 
one equation they attempt to address the problem by using the sub-sample of teachers who 
remain teachers for three or more years. 
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characteristics of all teachers by grade and subject within the school, or by restricting the sample 
to schools where any given subject is taught to the student’s grade by only one teacher within the 
school. Either way, the student is by construction matched to a single set of teacher 
characteristics in each subject within the school.  
It however remains the case that subject-varying school unobservables remain in the error 
term and may be correlated with the Union variable. Moreover, it is required that teachers’ 
unobserved characteristics be unrelated to the union variable. Since such omitted characteristics 
may be correlated both with Unionization status and with student achievement we cannot say that 
pupil fixed effects estimation of achievement – even with no subject-specific student and school 
unobserved heterogeneity – permits us to interpret the effects of Unionization as causal.  
We propose to address this issue by borrowing from the procedures set out in Altonji, 
Elder and Taber (2005) to assess the potential size of any bias due to the unobservables in the 
equation (an appendix summarises their algebra which we use below) . In their paper they show 
that the notion that “selection on observables is the same as selection on unobservables” is 
equivalent to a condition that in our model (where we drop subscripts for clarity) is: 
(6) ( , ) ( , )
( ) ( )
Cov v U Cov TC U
Var v Var TC
γ
γ=  
The asymptotic bias from OLS is ( , )
( )
Cov v U
Var U
%
% , which is equivalent to 
( , )
( )
Cov v U
Var U%  if and  are 
orthogonal (tildes over a variable denote the residuals from a regression of that variable onTC . 
We can estimate this bias by noting that: 
v TC
(7) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Cov v U Cov v U Var TC Cov TC U Var v
Var U Cov TC U Var v Var TC Var U
γ γ
γ γ=% %  
(8) ( , ) ( , ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
Cov v U Cov TC U Var v
Var U Var TC Var U
γ
γ=% %  
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where (8) follows from (7) using (6).  
 In reporting our regression results we will also show the results from applying this 
method. We do this by reporting the estimate of bias from equation (8). As we will show, for the 
school and student fixed effects regressions, the sign of the union effect is negative while the 
estimate of the potential bias induced by a correlation between the unobservables and the Union 
variable is positive. In this case the evidence points to the school and student fixed effects 
estimates of the union membership effect as being underestimates of the true negative impact. 
Where the sign of the effect and the bias are the same we report their ratio as this is open to the 
interpretation from Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) that it measures the size of the shift in the 
distribution of the unobservables necessary to explain away the implied effect from the Union 
treatment. We turn now to assessing the role of both observables and unobservables in 
determining student achievement.  
 
3 The Achievement Production Function 
The main result of the paper for student achievement is presented in Table 2, which pools all five 
subjects. In the top panel the only teacher characteristic included is teacher union membership, in 
the bottom panel we include those teacher covariates in the vector jkTC set out above. The first 
column is an OLS achievement production function with state dummy variables. The second and 
third columns show school and pupil fixed effects results. The school fixed effects equation 
includes the full set of pupil characteristics, including a measure of pupil ability (as measured by 
the ravens progressive matrices test). The achievement production function changes dramatically 
when moving from the OLS (Column 1) to the within school analysis of Column (2). Exploiting 
within pupil variation in Column (3) does not change the union effect significantly.  
 11
 In the top panel of Table 2, the coefficient on the union membership variable changes sign 
from positive to negative as we move from OLS to within-school analysis. While higher scoring 
schools are more likely to have unionized teachers, within a school the students of unionized 
teachers have sharply lower achievement levels. The bottom panel which includes the teacher 
covariates from TC shows a larger negative effect of unionization on achievement. These teacher 
characteristics do have a highly significant effect on student achievement and are positively 
correlated with the Union variable. Thus controlling for these observable aspects of the teacher 
increases the adverse effect of unionization on achievement. These results suggest that the 
achievement of a student in a subject that is taught by a unionized teacher is 0.23 standard 
deviations lower than his/her achievement in a subject taught by a non-unionized teacher. Having 
a unionized teacher appears inimical to student achievement. 
 The results from the procedures of Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) are shown in the 
bottom part of the Table. There is evidence of a potentially substantial bias in the OLS results. 
However once we move to the school and student fixed effects results, we find evidence of a 
positive correlation between the unobservables in the achievement equation and the Union 
variable, implying that the negative effect of Unionization on achievement is underestimated5.  
Table 3 tests whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of experience, tenure, 
permanent status and days of leave taken (arguments in equation (4)), which may be at least in 
part determined by the union status of the teacher. The inclusion of these variables does not affect 
the coefficient on union membership much. 
Table 4 shows various other robustness tests on the union membership effect. Though the 
magnitude of the coefficient on the union membership variable varies by sub-sample, it is 
                                                 
5 See the Appendix for the equation of union membership on theTC vector of variables. 
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negative and statistically significant in virtually all sub-samples, defined by student’s gender, 
religion, wealth and ability, and by political leaning of the state, degree of school competition and 
subject-combination used for differencing. Unions reduce achievement across the whole range of 
student ability (lowest quartile, middle 50% and the top quartile of achievers), though the 
coefficient is much smaller for low achievers than for middle and high achievers 6.  
As a final robustness check we present in Table 5 the achievement equation on the sub-
sample of schools that had any unionized teachers, which increases the proportion of the sample 
of children taught by a unionized teacher to 37 per cent. The coefficient on the union membership 
variable is very similar to that in Table 3. Table 5 also shows that teachers’ possession of MA 
qualifications and teachers’ cognitive skills (proxied by first division in board exam) raise student 
achievement only in the non-unionized schools, i.e. the productivity of teacher characteristics is 
greater in non-union schools, a result similar to that in Hoxby (1996) where the beneficial effects 
of school inputs (such as lower class-size) and of teacher salary on pupil achievement are 
significantly lower in unionized than in non-unionized school districts. 
 
4 Teacher pay schedule 
How do unions impact on pay? We attempt to answer this question by examining the teacher pay 
schedule. All employers with more than 10 workers in India have to de jure abide by minimum 
wage laws and ‘recognized’ private schools are required to pay teachers salaries on a par with the 
government teacher salary scales. De facto, many private schools pay teachers significantly less 
                                                 
6 This contrasts somewhat with syntheses of the US literature which find that unions modestly 
improve the achievement level of students who are middle-range performers but reduce that of 
students who are low and high performers (Eberts, 2007; Stone, 2000; Carini, 2002; Betts, 1996). 
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than the government prescribed minima. For instance, at the middle school level, Kingdon (1996) 
found that private teachers’ mean salary was only 60% of the public teachers’ mean salary. 
Kingdon and Teal (2007) confirm that salary structures in public and private schools in India are 
very different.  
The survey for this study collected information on all teachers that taught grade 10 
students in sample schools. This yielded a sample of 2103 teachers of whom 1731 are teachers of 
the five compulsory subjects taught at grade 10 level. The first column of Table 6 presents an 
OLS equation of log of teacher pay but our data also have within-school variation in teacher pay, 
which is used to estimate a school fixed effects equation in column 2. The coefficients on some 
of the variables – and especially on the union membership variable – change when moving from 
across to within school estimation. Since teachers may sort into schools on the basis of their 
unobserved characteristics, we rely more on the school fixed effects regression in the second 
column.  
The variable of interest is union membership. It is seen that the coefficient on union 
membership is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Within a school, a union 
member earns a wage premium of 14.9% over non-union members. This regression does not 
control for the teacher characteristics identified above as potentially determined by unionization. 
If we include these, the union effect falls to 9.5% as is shown in Table 7. This is similar to the 
teacher union wage effect of 7.6% estimated by Lemke (2004) for Pennsylvania using data from 
school districts after accounting for aspects of teacher quality. It is also virtually identical to the 
union wage effect of 8-10% associated with other US public sector unions.  
Applying a similar test for the importance of unobservables to those already reported for 
the achievement equations, we do now find a positive potential bias on the positive union 
coefficient, but it is small compared with the size of the union pay effect. The ratio of effect to 
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bias is 1.65 which implies that the role of unobservables that determine pay would have to be 
more than 1.65 times the role of observables for the entire union pay effect to be explained away 
by the unobservables, which seems unlikely given the rich set of observables we include, 
including the school fixed effects. This suggests that part of the union pay effect is real. 
 
5 Conclusions 
Using a methodology for identification that allows for controls at the level of the pupil, we find 
that the achievement level of a student in a subject that is taught by a unionized teacher is about a 
quarter of a standard deviation lower than his/her achievement in a subject that is taught by a 
non-unionized teacher. A school fixed effects equation of teacher pay shows that union 
membership is rewarded with substantially higher pay. In other words, union membership of 
teachers reduces student achievement and raises salary costs in private schools in India. 
While we controlled for what are commonly regarded as the most important sources of 
omitted variable bias in the student achievement equation – namely the non-random matching of 
students to schools and teachers on the basis of their unobserved characteristics, teacher 
unobservables are still in the error term and could be related with observed teacher 
characteristics. We sought to deal with this potential source of bias by using the method of 
Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) and find, once we allow for school or student fixed effects, that 
the negative union effect on student achievement is, if anything, underestimated. For the teacher 
pay equation we find, using a similar method, that it is unlikely that the positive effect of union 
on pay can be explained away by bias due to unobservables.  
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Table 1 
Mean and standard deviation of raw mark, by subject 
 
Subject Mean mark SD Minimum Maximum 
English 67.15 15.3 20 97 
Second language 79.73 8.9 28 99 
History-geography 70.09 14.3 20 99 
Math 68.92 18.4 15 99 
Science 65.72 17.0 20 99 
 
Note: Descriptive statistics of standardized mark by subject are not reported as, by construction, 
the mean of standardized mark is 0 and standard deviation is 1 for each subject. 
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Table 2 
Achievement production function  
 
Panel A : ‘member of a union’ as the only included variable 
 OLS School FE Pupil FE 
 
Member of union 0.1816** -0.1755** -0.1671** 
 (4.22) (-5.28) (-5.05) 
Subject dummies yes yes yes 
Pupil variables yes yes no 
School variables yes no no 
N 49089 49089 49089 
R-squared 0.26 0.35 --- 
Number of clusters 16 172 10016 
F (p-value) 90.36 (0.000) 58.06 (0.000) 12.29 (0.000) 
 
Panel B: Including pre-determined teacher characteristics (TC) 
 OLS School FE Pupil FE 
Member of union  0.1788** -0.2342** -0.2266** 
 (4.17) (-6.91) (-6.72) 
MA or PhD qualification 0.1206** 0.0929** 0.0914** 
 (9.07) (9.63) (9.58) 
Pre-service teacher training 0.0602** 0.0871** 0.0885** 
 (4.66) (10.0) (10.2) 
First division in hisec exam 0.1020** 0.1092** 0.1053** 
 (5.35) (7.74) (7.52) 
Christian 0.0214 0.0254* 0.0252* 
 (1.43) (2.49) (2.49) 
Female -0.0384** 0.0039 0.0020 
 (-2.74) (0.40) (0.21) 
Age 0.0459** 0.0272** 0.0260** 
 (10.2) (8.69) (8.38) 
Age square -0.0005** -0.0003** -0.0003** 
 (-9.51) (-8.21) (-7.84) 
Subject dummies yes yes yes 
Pupil variables yes yes -- 
School variables yes -- -- 
Observations 49089 49089 49089 
R-squared 0.27 0.35 --- 
Number of clusters 16 172 10016 
    
Estimated Bias (Equation (8)) 0.57 0.27 0.91 
Ratio (a) 0.31 -- -- 
(a) This is the ratio of the coefficient on union membership and the estimated bias. 
Note: Constant included but not shown. Standard errors were corrected for clustering of errors 
between subjects within a pupil, i.e. we have used pupil id as the clustering variable. In all three 
columns, the fixed effects (state, school and pupil respectively) were highly statistically 
significant in F-tests (not shown). ** represents statistical significance at the 1% level and * at 
the 5% level. 
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Table 3 
Achievement production function 
(including the teacher characteristics in TC’)  
 
 OLS School FE Pupil FE 
Member of teacher union 0.1568** -0.2436** -0.2347** 
 (3.68) (-7.14) (-6.91) 
MA or PhD qualification 0.1272** 0.0934** 0.0923** 
 (9.55) (9.52) (9.51) 
Pre-service teacher training 0.0533** 0.0900** 0.0911** 
 (4.14) (10.3) (10.5) 
First division in hisec exam 0.0979** 0.1153** 0.1113** 
 (5.14) (8.15) (7.94) 
Christian -0.0130** -0.0053** -0.0060** 
 (-5.99) (-3.70) (-4.21) 
Female 0.0183 0.0249* 0.0247* 
 (1.21) (2.45) (2.45) 
Age -0.0335* 0.0062 0.0049 
 (-2.41) (0.64) (0.52) 
Age square 0.0271** 0.0252** 0.0240** 
 (5.53) (7.28) (7.00) 
Days of sick leave last year -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0002** 
 (-5.15) (-6.71) (-6.38) 
Total experience -0.0034** -0.0041** -0.0040** 
 (-3.18) (-5.49) (-5.37) 
Tenure 0.0035** 0.0030** 0.0030** 
 (3.29) (3.99) (4.07) 
Permanent status 0.1995** 0.0325* 0.0293* 
 (9.20) (2.36) (2.16) 
Subject dummies yes yes yes 
Pupil variables yes yes no 
School variables yes no no 
N 49089 49089 49089 
R-squared 0.27 0.35 --- 
Number of clusters 16 172 10016 
F (p-value) 98.3 (0.000) 54.5 (0.000) 11.3 (0.000) 
    
Estimated Bias (Equation 
(8)) 
0.64 0.31 0.88 
Ratio (a) 0.24 -- -- 
 
(a) This is the ratio of the coefficient on union membership and the estimated bias. 
 
Note: Constant included but not shown. Standard errors were corrected for clustering of errors 
between subjects within a pupil, i.e. we have used pupil id as the clustering variable. In all three 
columns, the fixed effects (state, school and pupil respectively) are highly statistically significant 
in F-tests. ** represents statistical significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level 
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Table 4 
Robustness tests – the union coefficient in different samples 
 
 Coefficient on  
union variable 
Robust  
t-value 
Pupil’s wealth quartile   
Bottom quartile -0.2070** -3.86 
Top 3 quartiles -0.2584** -5.95 
   
Pupil’s gender    
Boys -0.2106** -5.24 
Girls -0.3830** -6.52 
   
Pupil’s religion   
Hindu  -0.2039** -5.54 
Minority  -0.3397** -4.30 
   
Student ability   
Lowest quartile of total mark -0.1081* -1.97 
Middle two quartiles of total mark -0.2712** -4.89 
Top quartile of total mark -0.2206** -4.08 
   
Political leaning of the state(a)   
Non-Left state -0.2187** -3.21 
Left state -0.1497** -3.64 
   
Degree of school competition(b)   
Low  -0.0943 -1.26 
Medium -0.1435** -3.10 
High -0.4637** -6.94 
   
Three subject combinations   
English, second language, history-geography -0.2942** -4.70 
English second language, math -0.4728** -7.92 
English, second language, science -0.4480** -9.25 
English, history-geography, math -0.0962* -1.77 
English, history-geography, science -0.1399** -3.03 
English, math, science -0.0353 -1.02 
Second language, history-geography, math -0.1481** -2.93 
Second language, history-geography, science -0.1883** -4.99 
History-geography, math, science -0.4429** -11.01 
   
Four subject combinations   
English, second language, history-geography, math -0.2569** -5.59 
English, second language, history-geography, science -0.2566** -6.94 
English, history-geography, math, science -0.1049** -2.74 
English, second language, math, science -0.2006** -6.04 
Second language, history-geography, math, science -0.3431** -8.47 
 
Notes: All equations estimated using the pupil fixed effects estimator and using the exact 
specification of column 3 in the bottom panel (panel B) of Table 2, i.e. including controls for 
teacher variables. ** represents statistical significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level.  
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(a) ‘Left leaning’ states are West Bengal and Kerala, which have had communist parties in power 
in much of the post-independence period. The lower effect of teacher union-membership in the 
‘Left’ states may be because in their stronger pro-labour environment, teacher demands are 
satisfied without unionized teachers losing teaching days through strike action.  
(b) School competition is measured by the number of schools situated within a 5 km radius of the 
school. Fewer than 4 nearby schools corresponds to ‘low’ and greater than 12 corresponds to 
‘high’ competition. Union effects are greatest in high competition schools, perhaps because 
unionized teachers are less afraid of rent-seeking/shirking in high school concentration areas, 
where the teacher labor market is tighter and the prospect of getting other teaching jobs is greater. 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Pupil fixed effects achievement equation, on sub-sample of unionized schools  
 
 All schools§ Unionized schools 
Member of union  -0.2266** -0.2428** 
 (-6.72) (-5.94) 
MA or PhD qualification 0.0914** -0.0631* 
 (9.58) (-2.10) 
Pre-service teacher training 0.0885** 0.0793** 
 (10.2) (3.52) 
First division in hisec exam 0.1053** -0.1247* 
 (7.52) (-2.56) 
Christian 0.0252* -0.0604 
 (2.49) (-1.79) 
Female 0.0020 -0.2096** 
 (0.21) (-7.88) 
Age 0.0260** 0.0261 
 (8.38) (1.61) 
Age square -0.0003** -0.0003 
 (-7.84) (-1.34) 
Subject dummies yes Yes 
Observations 49089 4790 
Number of clusters (i.e. pupils) 10016 961 
 
Notes: § these are results for the whole sample, taken from the last column of Table 2b. ** 
represents statistical significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level.  
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Table 6 
Regression of log of teacher’s monthly pay  
(Teachers of grade 10 who teach the 5 main subjects only) 
 
 Across school 
(OLS)
Within school 
(school fixed effects)  
Teacher characteristics 
 
  
Member of union 0.3580* 0.1498* 
 (2.33) (2.26) 
MA or PhD 0.0555** 0.0401** 
 (2.65) (2.84) 
Teacher training 0.0697** 0.0596** 
 (3.39) (4.40) 
First division in hsec exam -0.0315 0.0134 
 (-1.00) (0.68) 
Christian 0.0607* 0.0618** 
 (2.25) (3.76) 
Female -0.0230 -0.0013 
 (-0.93) (-0.092) 
Age 0.0546** 0.0340** 
 (8.08) (5.33) 
Age square -0.0005** -0.0003** 
 (-6.05) (-3.57) 
   
Subject dummies yes yes 
School variables yes --- 
State dummies yes --- 
N 1731 1731 
R-squared 0.59 0.22 
Number of scid_n --- 183 
F (p-value) --- 35.43 (0.000) 
   
Estimated Bias (Equation (8)) 0.45 0.09 
Ratio (a) 0.89 1.65 
 
(a) This is the ratio of the coefficient on union membership and the estimated bias. 
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Table 7 
Regression of log of teacher’s monthly pay  
(including the teacher characteristics in TC’)  
 (Teachers of grade 10 who teach the 5 main subjects only) 
 
 Across school 
(OLS)
Within school 
(school fixed effects)  
Teacher characteristics 
 
  
Member of union 0.2932* 0.0947* 
 (2.13) (1.96) 
MA or PhD 0.0681** 0.0530** 
 (3.62) (4.30) 
Teacher training 0.0427* 0.0316** 
 (2.19) (2.72) 
First division in hsec exam -0.0537 -0.0036 
 (-1.77) (-0.20) 
Christian 0.0392 0.0397** 
 (1.52) (2.85) 
Female -0.0218 -0.0170 
 (-0.95) (-1.29) 
Age 0.0256** 0.0107 
 (3.90) (1.79) 
Age square -0.0003** -0.0001 
 (-3.68) (-1.68) 
Days of sick leave last year -0.0073* -0.0007 
 (-2.14) (-0.50) 
Total experience 0.0061** 0.0075** 
 (2.85) (4.30) 
Tenure 0.0133** 0.0095** 
 (6.68) (5.43) 
Permanent contract 0.1756** 0.1639** 
 (5.46) (5.54) 
   
Subject dummies yes yes 
School variables yes --- 
State dummies yes --- 
N 1731 1731 
R-squared 0.65 0.39 
Number of schools --- 183 
F (p-value) --- 35.43 (0.000) 
   
Estimated Bias (Equation (8)) 0.44 0.08 
Ratio (a) 0.74 1.20 
 
(a) This is the ratio of the coefficient on union membership and the estimated bias. 
Note: t-values are in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the school level. For School 
fixed-effects estimation, the number of groups is 183, i.e. estimation is within 183 schools. Mean 
number of teachers within a school is 9.5 (minimum=4, maximum=30). The F-test shows that the 
school dummies are jointly significant at the 0.000 level. Constant included but not shown. ** 
represents statistical significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of raw marks, by subject 
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Figure 2: Distribution of standardized marks, by subject 
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Appendix 
 
Selection on Unobservables 
 
In the Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) paper the issue is to assess the potential importance of 
unobservables in a bivariate probit model of a school outcome Y as a function of attending a 
catholic school (CH ). To gauge the role of selection bias in a simple way they ignore the fact that 
Y is timated by a probit and treates θ (th  parameter of interest to establish the casual affect of 
catholic schooling on outcomes) as if it were estimated by a regression of the latent variable *Y  
e
on X an CH re d whe X is a vector of observable determinants of both the Y and CH riables. In 
our application the outcome, student achievement as measured by the standardised mark, is a 
continuous variable but that does not affect the logic of the approach.  
va
 
We need to use an equation of the form:  
 
(A1) [ ]A U TCθ γ θβ ε= + + +)   
 
where we have dropped subscripts for clarity and  
 
(A2)  U TC Uβ= + %
 
which is equivalent to estimating our equation of interest which is: 
 
(A3) A U TCθ γ ε= + +  
 
By construction U and are orthogonal in (A1) and the standard formula for the potential bias 
in the
% TC
θ parameter is 
 
(A4) 
)~(
),(
)~(
),~(lim
UVar
UCov
UVar
UCovP εεθθ =+≈)  
 
The second equality follows from the fact thatε  and TC are orthogonal. 
 
The condition in the Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) paper which defines the notion that 
“selection on the unobservables” is the same as selection on observables is equivalent to the 
condition that: 
  
(A5) ( , ) ( , )
( ) ( )
Cov U Cov TC U
Var Var TC
ε γ
ε γ=   
 
The bias in (A4) can be written as: 
 
(A6) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Cov U Cov U Var TC Cov TC U Var
Var U Cov TC U Var Var TC Var U
ε ε γ γ
γ ε γ=% %
ε  
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Using (A5) this can be written as: 
 
(A7) ( , ) ( , ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
Cov U Cov TC U Var
Var U Var TC Var U
ε γ ε
γ=% %  
 
In their paper Altonji et. al. are concerned that a positive bias could be induced by the positive 
covariance between X and . In our application of their procedure we are concerned with the 
correlation between 
CH
TCγ  and U . In fact these are strongly positively correlated. This explains 
our argument in the text that selection on unobservables suggests that our estimation of the 
negative effect is a lower bound to the true negative effect of unionisation on student 
achievement. We report in Appendix Table A1 the results for both the student achievement mark 
and for union membership as a function of the  variables.  TC
 
 
Appendix Table A1 
 
Pupil fixed effects Linear probability model of union membership 
(union member=1; non-member=0) and of achievement score 
 
 Achievement score Union membership 
   
MA or PhD qualification 0.0903** 0.0050** 
 (9.48) (4.19) 
Pre-service teacher training 0.0805** 0.0351** 
 (9.39) (19.67) 
First division in hisec exam 0.1072** -0.0088** 
 (7.65) (-3.60) 
Christian 0.0297** -0.0198** 
 (2.94) (-11.36) 
Female 0.0001 0.0085** 
 (0.01) (5.22) 
Age 0.0262** -0.0009** 
 (8.44) (-4.89) 
Age square -0.0003** 0.0000** 
 (-7.93) (6.54) 
Subject dummies yes yes 
Observations 49089 49089 
Number of clusters 10016 10016 
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Appendix Table A2 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Definition Mean SD 
Pupil characteristics    
stdmark Standardized mark 0.000 1.00 
Male Child is male* 0.491 0.50 
Age in months Child’s age in months 195.055 8.90 
Age in months squared Age squared 38.126 3.56 
No. younger brothers Number of younger brothers 0.418 0.60 
No. of older brothers Number of older brothers 0.327 0.64 
No. of younger sisters Number of younger sisters 0.333 0.57 
No. of older sisters Number of older sisters 0.365 0.70 
Father’s education Father’s education in years 14.886 2.32 
Mother’s education Mother’s education in years 13.645 2.73 
Wears spectacles Child wears spectacles* 0.282 0.45 
Disabled Child is disabled* 0.003 0.06 
Sibling in similar school Any sibling studies in ICSE school 0.301 0.46 
Raven test score Score on Raven’s ability test 23.824 6.40 
Hours per day study at home Hours per day spent in study at home 4.033 1.61 
Hours per day domestic work Hours per day spent in domestic work 0.692 0.57 
Hours per day play Hours per day spent in playing 1.631 0.86 
Hours per day travel to school Hours per day spent in travel to school 0.614 0.48 
Hours per day spent in school Hours per day spent in school 6.223 0.73 
Household characteristics    
Household size Household size 5.361 2.62 
Religion Sikh Religion is Sikh* 0.058 0.23 
Religion Christian Religion is Christian* 0.078 0.27 
Religion Muslim Religion is Muslim* 0.069 0.25 
Wealth index Index of asset ownership 21.629 6.31 
Wealth index squared Wealth squared 507.608 256.85 
Other backward caste ‘other backward caste’* 0.062 0.24 
Schedule caste ‘scheduled caste’* 0.012 0.11 
Schedule tribe ‘scheduled tribe’* 0.017 0.13 
Teacher characteristics     
Gross monthly pay Teachers’ gross monthly pay (Rupees) 7864.421 2997.72 
Log monthly pay Log of teacher’s gross monthly pay 8.884 0.40 
MA or PhD Teacher has MA/MSc/PhD* 0.741 0.35 
Teacher training Years of teacher training 0.920 0.36 
First division in hisec exam 
 
Teacher got first division in Higher Secondary exam 
(Proxy for teacher’s cognitive skills) 0.092 0.23 
Days of sick leave Days of sick leave taken by teacher last year 2.182 2.70 
Member of union Teacher is member of a teacher union* 0.036 0.16 
Christian Teacher is Christian* 0.251 0.36 
Female Teacher is female* 0.723 0.39 
Age Teacher’s age 41.122 7.92 
Age square Teachers age squared 1778.512 667.40 
Total experience Years of work experience in teaching 13.388 7.17 
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Tenure Years of work experience in this school 10.037 6.67 
Permanent contract Teacher’s contract is permanent?* Yes=1; no=0 0.878 0.27 
    
 
School characteristics    
Total strength Total number of pupils in the school 1648.789 852.18 
Pupils in grade 10 (class size) Number of pupils in grade 10 111.175 59.55 
Principal influence index 
Index of principal's influence in school decision- 
making: lowest=1, highest=5 4.161 0.93 
Log monthly fee in grade 10 Log of monthly fee (rupees) 6.349 0.48 
Girls school Is a girls-only school* 0.210 0.41 
Higher secondary school Is a higher secondary school* 0.567 0.50 
Index of school resources Index of school resources 20.598 14.56 
    
 
Note: Variables marked with a * are 0/1 indicator variables with yes=1 and no=0. The means of 
all variables (pupil, teacher and school) in this table have been computed using the pupil-subject 
level dataset. 
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Appendix Table A3 
OLS Achievement production function, by subject 
 
 
English
Second  
language
History- 
geography Math Science     
      
Pupil characteristics 
 
     
Male -0.1686** -0.3601** -0.0148 0.0367 0.0354 
 (-8.71) (-16.1) (-0.69) (1.74) (1.66) 
Age in months  0.1287** 0.0816** 0.1469** 0.1807** 0.1752** 
 (6.63) (3.21) (6.34) (7.42) (7.26) 
Age in months squared -0.3505** -0.2403** -0.4093** -0.4973** -0.4862** 
 (-7.24) (-3.77) (-7.05) (-8.14) (-8.04) 
No. younger brothers -0.0478** -0.0275 -0.0205 -0.0278 -0.0308 
 (-3.35) (-1.59) (-1.27) (-1.66) (-1.89) 
No. of older brothers -0.0392** -0.0372* -0.0284 -0.0270 -0.0342* 
 (-2.98) (-2.13) (-1.89) (-1.70) (-2.20) 
No. of younger sisters -0.0248 -0.0355* -0.0180 -0.0340* -0.0459** 
 (-1.66) (-1.99) (-1.07) (-2.00) (-2.70) 
No. of older sisters -0.0225 0.0013 -0.0209 -0.0155 -0.0153 
 (-1.85) (0.094) (-1.51) (-1.08) (-1.08) 
Father’s education 0.0319** 0.0201** 0.0319** 0.0305** 0.0356** 
 (7.44) (3.90) (6.89) (6.37) (7.64) 
Mother’s education 0.0491** 0.0193** 0.0372** 0.0376** 0.0429** 
 (12.8) (4.44) (9.07) (8.77) (10.3) 
Wears spectacles 0.1377** 0.0778** 0.1120** 0.1191** 0.1173** 
 (7.97) (4.06) (5.96) (6.27) (6.26) 
Disabled -0.0438 -0.0703 0.0018 -0.1633 0.0622 
 (-0.43) (-0.43) (0.012) (-1.02) (0.40) 
Sibling in similar school 0.0231 -0.0690** 0.0395 0.0396 0.0258 
 (1.23) (-3.10) (1.88) (1.85) (1.20) 
Raven test score 0.0325** 0.0253** 0.0344** 0.0438** 0.0393** 
 (26.6) (17.1) (24.3) (30.1) (28.0) 
Hours per day in study at home -0.0045 0.0033 -0.0069 0.0174** 0.0125* 
 (-0.82) (0.54) (-1.14) (2.89) (2.08) 
Hours per day in domestic work -0.0557** -0.0230 -0.0728** -0.0831** -0.0818** 
 (-3.84) (-1.35) (-4.60) (-5.11) (-5.06) 
Hours per day in play -0.0186 -0.0128 -0.0174 -0.0245* -0.0277* 
 (-1.95) (-1.16) (-1.63) (-2.23) (-2.54) 
Hours per day in travel to school 0.0182 0.0046 -0.0070 0.0212 0.0249 
 (1.13) (0.24) (-0.39) (1.16) (1.39) 
Hours per day spent in school -0.0016 0.0478** 0.0605** 0.0484** 0.0043 
 (-0.097) (2.40) (3.63) (2.63) (0.25) 
Household characteristics      
Household size -0.0060 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0025 -0.0057 
 (-1.86) (-0.036) (-0.33) (-0.62) (-1.50) 
Religion Sikh -0.1114** -0.0976* -0.0785 -0.1285** -0.0610 
 (-2.80) (-2.19) (-1.69) (-2.77) (-1.30) 
Religion Christian 0.0575 -0.3537** -0.0730* -0.2140** -0.1927** 
 (1.72) (-8.58) (-2.06) (-5.62) (-5.36) 
Religion Muslim -0.0240 -0.1757** -0.0824* -0.1598** -0.1039** 
 (-0.77) (-4.69) (-2.42) (-4.36) (-2.95) 
Wealth index 0.0132* -0.0002 0.0178** 0.0216** 0.0115 
 (2.27) (-0.027) (2.74) (3.23) (1.72) 
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Wealth index squared -0.0004** -0.0003 -0.0006** -0.0007** -0.0005** 
 (-2.78) (-1.74) (-3.77) (-4.26) (-3.14) 
Other Backward Caste -0.0370 -0.0069 -0.1041** -0.0980** -0.0697 
 (-1.09) (-0.16) (-2.79) (-2.60) (-1.90) 
Schedule caste 0.0938 -0.0040 -0.0011 -0.0307 0.0272 
 (1.22) (-0.046) (-0.013) (-0.37) (0.34) 
Schedule tribe -0.0917 -0.0087 -0.2323** -0.2467** -0.1752* 
 (-1.37) (-0.11) (-3.21) (-3.29) (-2.48) 
Teacher characteristics 
 
     
Member of teacher union 0.1969** 0.2667** 0.0759 0.0614 -0.0124 
 (2.95) (4.08) (1.00) (1.00) (-0.23) 
Log of monthly pay 0.4612** 0.3730** 0.4346** 0.2501** 0.3740** 
 (11.2) (8.30) (9.67) (5.95) (8.45) 
MA or PhD qualification -0.0034 0.1832** 0.0407 0.0371 0.1737** 
 (-0.11) (5.42) (1.23) (1.30) (4.16) 
Pre-service teacher training 0.0181 0.0130 0.0572 0.0285 -0.0702* 
 (0.67) (0.37) (1.74) (1.13) (-2.11) 
First division in hisec exam -0.0150 0.2420** 0.0332 -0.1088* -0.2201* 
 (-0.32) (6.05) (0.66) (-2.43) (-2.39) 
Days of sick leave last year -0.0062 -0.0134** -0.0072 -0.0157** -0.0122** 
 (-1.63) (-4.34) (-1.81) (-4.39) (-2.65) 
Christian 0.0729** 0.1151** -0.1503** -0.1309** -0.0268 
 (3.16) (2.79) (-4.69) (-4.17) (-0.67) 
Female 0.0641* 0.0410 -0.1059** -0.0588* 0.0033 
 (2.07) (1.09) (-3.66) (-2.27) (0.080) 
Age 0.0035 -0.0108 0.0221 0.0255* -0.0057 
 (0.42) (-0.75) (1.58) (2.08) (-0.34) 
Age square -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004* 0.0000 
 (-1.05) (0.89) (-1.11) (-2.44) (0.080) 
Total experience 0.0051* -0.0003 -0.0210** 0.0106** 0.0180** 
 (2.03) (-0.15) (-7.22) (4.00) (4.34) 
Tenure -0.0043 -0.0036 -0.0079** -0.0037 -0.0046 
 (-1.76) (-1.74) (-3.05) (-1.73) (-1.24) 
Permanent status -0.0047 0.5208** 0.2888** 0.1260** 0.0506 
 (-0.15) (7.78) (6.33) (3.24) (1.21) 
School characteristics 
 
     
Total strength 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0002** 
 (6.69) (5.90) (8.94) (13.4) (10.3) 
Pupils (class-size) in grade 10  -0.0008* -0.0013** -0.0013** -0.0030** -0.0020** 
 (-2.40) (-3.78) (-3.93) (-8.73) (-6.32) 
Principal influence index 0.0537** 0.0672** 0.0733** 0.0453** 0.0353** 
 (4.94) (5.12) (5.68) (3.84) (3.02) 
Log monthly fee in grade 10 0.0875** -0.0004 -0.1131** -0.0595* -0.0400 
 (3.24) (-0.013) (-3.88) (-2.12) (-1.44) 
Girls school 0.3391** 0.0198 0.1826** 0.1326** 0.1479** 
 (13.4) (0.69) (6.45) (4.35) (4.95) 
Higher secondary school -0.0987** -0.0533* -0.0588** 0.0592** -0.0034 
 (-4.99) (-2.27) (-2.74) (2.77) (-0.15) 
Index of school resources 0.0136** -0.0001 0.0075** 0.0044** 0.0049** 
 (14.1) (-0.043) (6.88) (4.18) (4.76) 
State dummies 
 
     
Andhra Pradesh -0.3024** -0.8926** -0.4498** -0.3454** -0.2704** 
 (-5.05) (-11.6) (-7.20) (-5.34) (-4.35) 
 32
 33
Bihar -0.5308** -0.2934** -0.3865** -0.1288 -0.2684** 
 (-9.15) (-3.89) (-6.06) (-1.86) (-3.66) 
Gujarat -0.7744** -0.9335** -0.6923** -0.3956** -0.3686** 
 (-8.71) (-8.74) (-6.71) (-4.00) (-4.05) 
Haryana -0.8423** -1.0750** -0.4381** -0.2394** -0.4024** 
 (-14.1) (-14.9) (-6.30) (-3.34) (-5.48) 
Himachal  -0.3235** -0.6683** -0.1949** -0.3302** -0.3363** 
 (-5.56) (-9.31) (-3.15) (-5.18) (-5.28) 
Karnataka -0.3213** -1.1284** -0.2983** -0.4948** -0.4173** 
 (-6.00) (-16.4) (-5.13) (-8.18) (-6.91) 
Maharashtra -0.6101** -0.9220** -0.4095** -0.4357** -0.4213** 
 (-11.2) (-12.6) (-6.25) (-6.75) (-6.57) 
Madhya Pradesh -1.0217** -0.9566** -0.8276** -0.5693** -0.6783** 
 (-15.3) (-12.5) (-11.5) (-7.51) (-9.46) 
Orissa -0.3292** -0.5465** -0.2795** -0.1355* -0.3109** 
 (-5.98) (-8.27) (-4.85) (-2.19) (-5.00) 
Punjab -0.8400** -0.6425** -0.4538** -0.3788** -0.5958** 
 (-13.8) (-8.75) (-6.54) (-5.62) (-8.42) 
Rajasthan -0.8771** -0.8967** -0.0721 -0.3362** -0.4704** 
 (-10.5) (-8.95) (-0.84) (-3.37) (-4.69) 
Tamil Nadu -0.3212** -0.3762** -0.2887** -0.1803* -0.1857** 
 (-4.78) (-4.31) (-3.66) (-2.48) (-2.60) 
Uttar Pradesh -0.8643** -0.8614** -0.7276** -0.5292** -0.7383** 
 (-16.8) (-13.9) (-12.9) (-8.86) (-12.1) 
West Bengal -0.4901** -1.0550** -0.5533** -0.4222** -0.5451** 
 (-9.36) (-16.1) (-9.27) (-7.01) (-8.98) 
Chattisgarh -0.8375** -1.0733** -0.7433** -0.7562** -0.6671** 
 (-11.0) (-9.78) (-7.16) (-7.40) (-6.13) 
_constant -18.3856** -11.1105** -18.9495** -21.2663** -20.7108** 
 (-9.26) (-4.35) (-8.17) (-8.70) (-8.54) 
Observations 9772 9864 9833 9903 9717 
R-squared 0.44 0.24 0.33 0.30 0.33 
 
Note: the standard errors and thus t-values are corrected for the correlation of the errors between 
pupils within a school, i.e. we have used the pupil id as the clustering variable. The reference 
category for State is Kerala. 
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